"By Knowledge & By Love" (part 2 of 2)

By Knowledge & By Love            Michael Sherwin OP    CUA Press, 2005

    Part 2 of 2                                                                                                                           By Br. Dominicus

Fr. Michael Sherwin OP wrote an intriguing book that discusses this idea
from a Thomistic perspective in his book "By Knowledge and by Love." The core
of his argument is that this concept of freedom and morality, which is often
referred to as the "Fundamental Option" is based on a mistaken understanding of
the human will as "the ability to engage in a motion that wholly 'precedes and is
independent of reason.'" (7) Partly based on his reading of philosophers of the modern
Anglo-American philosophical tradition and partly on Aquinas (and being a
student of Pinckaers…), he believes that such an "empty" approach to the will is
wrong. Human beings are desiring beings; however, they are not merely driven by
desire. They are driven by desire and, what he calls, vision and understanding of
how the world is and what has importance. However, "[p]ure desire requires
clarified vision, while clear vision is the product of purified desire." (8) Human
desire is a desire for the good. Sherwin shows that in modern thinking of two of the
most famous Catholic philosophers of the last 75 years, two aspects of this
"vision" are emphasized. Elizabeth Anscombe explains that to have an
understanding of a certain virtue, a real good, one has to presuppose a conception
of the "ideal" man "that functions as the norm according to which one acts." (9) So
virtue, the good, has a universal content. Alasdair MacIntyre expands this insight
into the social context. "Virtue … always requires for its application the acceptance
of some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which
it has to be defined and explained." (10) You need a community in which to learn to
live and love virtuously.

Fr. Sherwin distinguishes three weaknesses in the Fundamental Option
approach. First, the idea that if all that matters is your fundamental choice for love,
love, charity and moral goodness seem to be emptied of any conceptual content. If
love is whatever you say it is, then it is impossible to describe what a charitable life
is in practice. It is, after all, whatever you say it is. What is charitable for you does
not have to be charitable for me. (11) However a truly human act (so not breathing or
sneezing), one that involves the all our faculties is always related to objective
cognitive content. It is related to some view of the Good. Secondly, it seems that
for this approach, knowledge of God is almost irrelevant. It is about the self not the
Other. Thirdly, it radically separates love from practical reason and acting. It is all
about a fundamental orientation. Because of that, it seems that the cognitive
content of charity has no role to play in judging the right course of action. (12)

With Aquinas, Sherwin argues that will and reason cannot be separated if we
want a true understanding of the moral life. As created beings, we are desiring,
willing beings. We, however, do not blindly follow our desires. As rational
creatures, "every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect." (13) We act in a
certain way because we believe that it contributes to our flourishing. Our appetites
follow our reason. The object of our will, our acting, is not merely "the good, but
the apprehended good."(14)  In order to become good people, we "[n]eed to acquire
wisdom and love. In the context of the "personal" character of love's goal, Aquinas'
teaching implies that in order to perform morally good acts, we must discover the
truth about God and ourselves, and love this truth in our actions. On the natural
level, wisdom and love are attained through the dispositions that the tradition calls
the cardinal virtues." (15)

Discovering the truth about God, ourselves, and what the right thing to do is
not a matter of subjective self-actualization. No, we acquire it by applying
universal principles of reason to our study and to concrete actions.

         The key to understanding Aquinas' theory of virtue is his notion that
         the universal and particular knowledge employed in practical
         reasoning flows from different sources. The universal knowledge
         flows from the natural habit of the first practical principles, while the
         particular knowledge is acquired through sense knowledge and
         experience. (16)

         [...] Aquinas holds that the will is naturally rightly ordered with regard
         to its proper object, which is the good of reason (bonum rationis).
         Aquinas elsewhere describes the good of reason as the "the good in
        general" (bonum universale). As we have seen, Aquinas maintains
        that included in the general notion of the good are all the particular
        things that reason apprehends as goods fitting to the agent him or
        herself. (17)

Fr. Sherwin's book is more detailed, technical, and rich than can be
explained here. He is an optimistic, clear and sympathetic voice. He is truly worth
reading. I believe he gives a very convincing argument not to see the will as
radically autonomous from reason.

        St. Thomas' theology suggests that any adequate portrayal of the
        moral life will respect the dynamic relationship between intellect and
        will, knowledge and love, in human action.
        Every human act if it is a truly human act, is done from knowledge
        and with love. Far from implying intellectual or psychological
        determinism. love's relationship to knowledge ensures that, even for
        the hardened sinner, moral growth is always possible.[A] core
        Thomistic principle remains true: when grace elevates and heals
        wounded human nature, it does so in a way that respects that nature. (18)


(7) Ibid. P. 11. Cf. For a more detailed discussion of the fundamental option see Germain Grisez,
The Way of the Lord Jesus, Chapter 16: The Distinction Between Grave and Light Matter,
Question B: What are the current theories of fundamental option? http://twotlj.org/G-1-16-B.html:
Beyond this general framework, current fundamental-option theories take two different forms.
One treats fundamental option as a basic commitment. Commitment is thought of either as an
extraordinary choice or an aspect of many choices. This approach begins with a fact: Many
people do make central commitments which organize their lives. From this fact proponents
proceed to the conclusion that everyone must make a most fundamental commitment, for or
against God (for, by explicit love of God or a commitment to live the moral life; or against, by an
opposite love or commitment). The basic commitment is supposed to establish a predominant
thrust or momentum, such that occasional acts incompatible with it usually cannot radically alter
or reverse it.
(4). The second form regards fundamental option as something more mysterious than a
basic commitment: a total self-disposal, attributed not to free choice but to another
freedom, often called “fundamental freedom” or “basic freedom.” Most who take this
approach overlook the existential dimension of free choice and attribute self-determination to
fundamental option. Some do realize that freedom of choice and self-determination are linked
together. But, supposing them nonidentical, they think one can freely choose in a way
inconsistent with one's fundamental option without altering that option.
(8) Sherwin. xx
(9) Ibid. P. xxi
(10) Idem
(11) Ibid. P. 15
(12) CF. For another list of criticism of the fundamental option see Germain Grisez, The Way of the
Lord Jesus, Chapter 16: The Distinction Between Grave and Light Matter Question E: What
other reasons tell against current theories of fundamental option?  http://www.twotlj.org/G-1-16-
E.html
(13) Sherwin, Ibid. P. 20
(14) Ibid. P. 21
(15) Ibid. P. 106
(16) Ibid. P. 112
(17) Ibid. P 113
(18) Ibid. P. 239/240